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Abstract
Domain name system (DNS) is a crucial part of the Internet,
yet has been widely exploited by cyber attackers. Apart from
making static methods like blacklists or sinkholes infeasible,
some weasel attackers can even bypass detection systems
with machine learning based classifiers. As a solution to this
problem, we propose a robust domain detection system named
HinDom. Instead of relying on manually selected features,
HinDom models the DNS scene as a Heterogeneous Informa-
tion Network (HIN) consist of clients, domains, IP addresses
and their diverse relationships. Besides, the metapath-based
transductive classification method enables HinDom to detect
malicious domains with only a small fraction of labeled sam-
ples. So far as we know, this is the first work to apply HIN in
DNS analysis. We build a prototype of HinDom and evaluate
it in CERNET2 and TUNET. The results reveal that HinDom
is accurate, robust and can identify previously unknown mali-
cious domains.
1 Introduction
Though improved increasingly, the Internet is still widely used
by adversaries who misuse benign services or protocols to run
malicious activities. As a foundation of the Internet, Domain
Name System (DNS) provides mappers among IP addresses
and domain names, identifying services, devices or other re-
sources in the network. As a consequence, domains are one
of the major attack vectors used in various cybercrimes, such
as spams, phishing, malware and botnets, etc. Therefore, it is
essential to effectively detect and block malicious domains
when combating cyber attackers.
After some flexibility-increasing techniques (e.g. Fast-Flux,
Domain-Flux, Double-Flux, etc) make static block meth-
ods like blacklists infeasible, extensive researches are pro-
posed for malicious domain detection. Traditional systems
[3–6, 8, 21] mostly follow a feature based approach. Though
these researches get relatively good performance, potential
problems are commonly ignored. First, in the training phase,
these detection systems require labeled datasets large enough
to guarantee accuracy and coverage. However, the fickle na-
ture of DNS makes accurate labeling an arduous process.
Second, it seems they treat each domain individually and rely
on some manually selected statistical features (e.g. number of
distinct IP addresses, the standard deviation of TTL, etc), mak-
ing the detection system easy to be evaded by sophisticated
attackers [2, 7, 14]. Some researchers [18, 25, 28, 38] intend to
utilize structural information for a more robust detection sys-
tem. However, under the limitations of homogeneous network
methods, almost all these researchers model the DNS-related
data into a client-domain bipartite graph [28] or a domain-IP
bipartite graph [19]. In this case, they can represent at most
two types of entities and utilize only one kind of relationship,
leaving plenty of information untapped.
Facing the problems mentioned above, we propose an in-
telligent domain detection system named HinDom. First, to
fuse more information and introduce higher-level semantics,
we model the DNS scene into a Heterogeneous Information
Network (HIN), as a HIN model can represent diverse com-
ponents and relations. Second, a transductive classification
method is applied to make use of the structural information,
and therefore reduces the dependence on labeled datasets. Be-
sides, considering real-world practicality, we design a series
of filtering rules to improve efficiency and reduce noises.
In HinDom, we hold the intuitions that, 1) a domain which
has strong associations with the known malicious domains is
likely to be malicious and 2) attackers can falsify domains in-
dividually but cannot easily distort their associations. Thus, to
be more robust against attackers’ evasion tactics, we first nat-
urally model the DNS scene into a HIN with client nodes, do-
main nodes, IP address nodes and the following six types of re-
lations among them: (i) Client-query-Domain, client a queries
domain b. (ii) Client-segment-Client, client a and client b be-
long to the same network segment. (iii) Domain-resolve-IP,
domain a is resolved to IP address b. (iv) Domain-similar-
Domain, domain a and domain b have similar character-level
distribution. (v) Domain-cname-Domain, domain a and do-
main b are in a CNAME record. (vi) IP-domain-IP, IP address
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a and IP address b are once mapped to the same domain. Then
multiple meta-paths are built to represent connections among
domains and the PathSim algorithm [32] is applied to com-
pute the similarity among domain nodes. The similarities
derived from different meta-paths are combined according
to Laplacian Scores [15], excavating associations among do-
mains over multiple views. Finally, illuminated by LLGC [37],
GNetMine [17] and HetPathMine [22], a meta-path based
transductive classification method is introduced to HinDom
to make full use of the information provided by unlabeled
samples.
To sum up, we make the following contributions in this
research:
1) A comprehensive represent model. We naturally rep-
resent the DNS scene by modeling clients, domains, IP ad-
dresses and their diverse relations into a HIN. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first work to introduce HIN in
malicious domain detection. The combined domain similarity
formulated over multiple meta-paths fully represents the rich
semantics contained in DNS-related data.
2) Transductive classification in HIN. To reduce the cost
of obtaining label information, we apply a meta-path based
transductive classification method in HinDom. The experi-
ment results show that HinDom yields ACC: 0.9960, F1-score:
0.9902 with 90% labeled samples and can still detect mali-
cious domains with ACC: 0.9626, F1-score: 0.9116 when the
initial labeled sample rate decreases to 10%.
3) Practicality evaluation. We implement a prototype of
HinDom and evaluate its performance in two realistic net-
works, CERNET2 and TUNET. During the deployment, we
are able to detect long-buried mining botnets in these two ed-
ucational networks. The evaluation results show that HinDom
is practical in real-world and can identify malicious domains
unrevealed by public blacklists.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After pre-
senting related work in Section 2 and introducing necessary
preliminaries in Section 3, we describe HinDom’s framework
and the technical details of each component in Section 4.
Section 5 reports the experiment results and real-world evalu-
ations. We discuss limitations and future work in Section 6
and summarize our work in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Malicious domain detection. As static block methods like
blacklists become infeasible, plenty of researches have been
proposed to detect malicious domains. We group them into
two categories: object-based approaches and association-
based approaches. It is hard to practice a fair comparison
between HinDom and these prior researches, as both their
datasets and system implementations are unavailable. In this
section, we provide detailed introductions of researches in
each group and discuss why HinDom is more advanced.
object-based approaches. Their general method is to first
build a classifier based on features extracted from various
DNS-related data. Then after being trained with a ground truth
dataset, the classifier can be used to inspect unlabeled domains.
Notos [3] assigns reputation scores to domains by analyzing
network and zone features. It trains classifiers to measure
a domain’s closeness with five pre-labeled groups (Popular,
Common, Akamai, CDN and Dynamic DNS) and uses the
calculated scores as features for final detection. Exposure [6]
extends the scope of detection to malicious domains involved
in spams, phishing, etc and obtains higher efficiency with
lower requirements for training data. Kopis [4] gets larger vis-
ibility by leveraging traffic among top-level-domain servers.
Some works aim at detecting a specific kind of malicious do-
mains. Pleiades [5] detects algorithmically generated domains
(AGDs) by analyzing NXDomain responses in DNS traffic
while others [20,29,36] focus on AGDs’ distinguish character
distributions. In these researches, various resources are ac-
cessed for data enrichment (e.g. ASN, WHOIS, geo-location,
network traffic, etc), yet they are analyzed in a coarse-grained
way. The classifier treats each domain individually and re-
lies on many statistic results as features, which makes the
detection system easy to be evaded by sophisticated attackers.
For instance, character patterns of malicious domains can be
designed to imitate those of the benign ones [2, 14]. It is also
easy for attackers to change temporal patterns like request
intervals or TTL values, which commonly service as major
features of the classifiers. HinDom is more robust by further
utilizing the rich structural information among domains.
association-based approaches. Systems in this group get
more macro perspectives by utilizing the relationships among
domains. Manadhata et al. [25] build a bipartite client-domain
graph and apply belief propagation to discover malicious do-
mains. Segugio [28] focuses on the who is querying what
information and constructs a machine-domain bipartite graph
based on DNS traffic between clients and the resolver. Khalil
et al. [18] build a domain-IP graph based on a passive DNS
dataset and then simplify it to a domain graph for detection.
Futai Zou et al. [38] try to utilize both the client-query-domain
relation and the domain-resolve-IP relation by constructing a
DNS query response graph and a passive DNS graph. How-
ever, due to the limitations of homogeneous network analy-
sis methods, all the above researches can represent at most
two types of nodes and utilize only one type of relationship,
leaving plenty of information in DNS-related data untapped.
HinDom solves this problem with a HIN model which can
represent multiple types of nodes and relations for a more
comprehensive analysis.
Heterogeneous information network. In recent years, an
increasing number of researches start to focus on the im-
portance of heterogeneous information network and apply it
to various fields, such as link prediction, recommender sys-
tem, information fusion, etc [31]. Hindroid [16] is the first
work to apply HIN in information security field. By analyz-
ing different relations among API calls in Andriod program,
HinDriod extracts higher-level semantics to discover Android
malware precisely. Scorpion [11] use HIN to model relations
among archives, files, APIs and DLLs for malware detection.
As for transductive classification in HIN, GNetMine [17] is
the first work to expand a transductive classification method
named LLGC [37] from homogeneous network to HIN. Het-
PathMine [22] utilizes metapaths to set different classification
criterions for different types of objects. Grempt [35] generates
local estimated labels for unlabeled samples and expands the
transductive method from classification to regression. Illumi-
nated by these researches, our work shows HIN’s usefulness
in malicious domain detection.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Heterogeneous Information Network
In the real world, most systems contain diverse interactions
among different types of components. However, for ease of
analysis, they are usually modeled as homogeneous networks
with unique type of nodes and links. In this case, information
loss is caused by ignoring differences among objects and rela-
tionships. Recently, researchers start to model these systems
into Hetergeneous Information Networks (HINs) [33], which
can fuse richer semantics and support more comprehensive
represents. The basic concepts of HIN are as follows.
Definition 1. Hetergeneous Information Network
(HIN) [33]. Given a graph G=〈V,E〉, where V is the
set of nodes, E is the set of links. m types of objects are
denoted as V1={v11,v12, ...,v1n1}, ...,Vm={vm1,vm2, ...vmnm},
where ni is the number of the i-th type nodes
and p types of relationships are denoted as
E1={E11,E12,...,E1q1},...,Ep={ep1,ep2, ...epqp}, where
qi is the number of the i-th type of relations. We regard G
as a HIN if m ≥ 2 or p ≥ 2. When m=p=1, G reduces to a
homogeneous network.
Definition 2. Network Schema [33]. TG = 〈A,R〉 is the net-
work schema of a HIN G= 〈V,E〉, with type mapping function
ϕ : V → A and ψ : E→ R, where A is the set of object types
and R is the set of relationship types.
Definition 3. metapath [32]. Given a network schema TG =
〈A,R〉, a metapath P defines a composite relation R = R1 ◦
R2 ◦ ... ◦RL between A1 and AL+1, where ◦ is the relation
composition operator. P is denoted as A1
R1−→ A2 R2−→ ... RL−→
AL+1, where L is the length of the metapath.
Figure 1 shows a HIN model of the bibliographic dataset
DBLP [12]. It represents four types of nodes: paper (P), au-
thor (A), conference (C) and keyword (K), as well as four
kinds of links: authors write papers, papers are published in
conferences, papers contain keywords and a paper cites other
Figure 1: An example of HIN instance (a) and its network
schema (b)
papers. The relation between author and conference can be
represented as metapath A write−−−→ P published−−−−−→ C, or APC for
short. Metapath APCPA indicates the relation that authors
have published papers on the same conference. To sum up, a
HIN instance contains detailed information while its network
schema describes the structural constraints and metapaths are
used to represent complex relations among entities.
3.2 Transductive Classification
Unlike inductive classification, instead of learning general de-
cision functions from training data, transductive classification
infers from specific training cases to specific test cases. The
situation is more like to propagate label information over the
whole network. Therefore, when there are many test samples
but few labeled training samples, transductive methods can
classify more effectively with the utilization of information
from the unlabeled data. Based on definitions in Section 3.1,
transductive classification in HIN can be defined as follow.
Definition 4. Transductive classification in HIN [17].
Given a HIN G = 〈V,E〉 and a subset of its labeled nodes
V˜ ⊆V with their label information denoted by vector Y, trans-
ductive classification is to predict labels for nodes in V −V˜ .
4 HinDom System Description
The intuition of HinDom is that domains with strong relation-
ships tend to belong to the same class (benign or malicious).
Besides, attackers can only falsify domain’s features indi-
vidually but cannot easily control the natural associations
generated in DNS. We model clients, domains, IP addresses
as well as their relations into a HIN and analyze six types of
associations among domains based on the following two ob-
servations: (i) Attackers are subjected to the cost of network
resources. That is, though trying to stay dynamic, attackers
tend to reuse network resources due to economic constraints.
Figure 2: The architecture of HinDom
(ii) The set of malicious domains queried by victims of the
same attacker tend to overlap.
As shown in Figure 2, HinDom has five main components:
Data Collector, HIN Constructor, Graph Pruner, Meta-path
Combiner and Transductive Classifier. After DNS-related data
are collected (step 1), a HIN consist of clients, domains, IP
addresses and their various relations is constructed to repre-
sent the DNS scene (step 2). Then some nodes in the graph
are pruned to filter noises and reduce computing complexity
(step 3). We analyze six different meta-paths and combine
them according to their influences on domain detection (step
4). Finally, based on some initial label information, the trans-
ductive classifier categorizes unlabeled domains (step 5). We
analyze the classification result and add it to private whitelist
or blacklist for further detection (step 6). In the following, we
will introduce each component in detail.
4.1 Data Collector
To obtain richer information that reveals the behavior of actual
users, instead of sending specific DNS queries on purpose,
we execute DNS data collection passively. Three major data
sources that we collect are: (i) DNS server log. When dealing
with queries, DNS servers generate logs to collect informa-
tion like source IP, queried domain, time, etc. Among all the
logs, those of the recursive servers are widely used to extract
information about "who is querying what" in local area net-
works. (ii) DNS traffic. It contains the most comprehensive
information with various fields such as NS, MX, TXT, PTR,
etc. Yet, considering privacy issues, this kind of data is hard to
share publicly. (iii) Passive DNS dataset. Some organizations
(e.g. Internet Systems Consortium, Farsight Security [10],
360 NetLab [26], etc.) have constructed passive DNS (pDNS)
systems with sensors voluntarily deployed by contributors
in their infrastructures. They aggregate the captured DNS
messages before making them publicly available. Records in
pDNS do not contain client information. They only offer the
first and last timestamps of a domain’s appearance, as well as
the total number of domain-IP resolutions in between.
The data collector collects resolver’s logs or DNS traffic be-
tween clients and the resolver in a local area network (LAN)
during a time window T, which can be set to an hour, a day
or a week, considering computing resources and the network
size. Noting that HinDom can construct the HIN model just
based on DNS response traffic. But pDNS dataset can provide
richer information on domain-IP relations in both spatial and
temporal dimensions. Besides, when DNS traffic data is un-
available due to permission or technique restrictions, HinDom
can utilize DNS logs construct the client-domain part and use
pDNS dataset for the domain-IP part.
4.2 HIN Constructor
As shown in Figure 3, based on the collected data, HinDom
naturally models the DNS scene as a HIN consist of clients,
domains, IP addresses and six types of relations among them.
The details of these relations are as follows and Table 1 lists
their corresponding adjacent matrices.
• Client-query-Domain, we use matrix Q to denote that
domain i is queried by client j.
• Client-segment-Client, we use matrix N to denote that
client i and client j belong to the same network segment.
• Domain-resolve-IP, we use matrix R to denote that do-
main i is resolved to IP address j.
• Domain-similar-Domain, we use matrix S to denote the
character-level similarity between domain i and j.
• Domain-cname-Domain, we use matrix C to denote that
domain i and domain j are in a CNAME record.
• IP-domain-IP, we use matrix D to denote that IP address
i and IP address j are once mapped to the same domain.
All these adjacent matrices can be naturally extracted from
the DNS-related data except matrix S which indicates the
Figure 3: HIN instance (a) and its network schema (b) in
HinDom
character-level similarity among domains. We use n-gram to
process the domain name strings, regard the results of the
entire dataset as a vocabulary and embed each domain into
a characteristic vector. Then we use the K-Means algorithm
to cluster these vectors into K categories and transform the
clustering result into matrix S. In our experiments, we test
uni-gram, bi-gram and tri-grams for both types of features.
Tri-grams brings a marginal improvement with much more
cost on memory requirements. Considering performance and
complexity, we concatenate uni-grams and bi-grams as fea-
tures and empirically set K = 20.
Table 1: Elements and descriptions of the relation matrices
Matrix Element Description
Q qi, j if domain i is queried by client j, then
qi, j = 1, otherwise, qi, j = 0.
N ni, j symmetric, if client i and j belong to
the same network segment, then ni, j
= n j,i = 1, otherwise, ni, j =n j,i = 0.
R ri, j if domain i is resolved to ip j, then ri, j
= 1, otherwise, ri, j = 0.
S si, j symmetric, if domain i and j are simi-
lar on character level, then si, j = s j,i =
1, otherwise, si, j = s j,i = 0.
C ci, j symmetric, if domain i is the cname
of domain j, then ci, j = c j,i = 1, other-
wise, ci, j = c j,i = 0.
D di, j symmetric, if IP address i and j are
once resolved to the same domain,
then di, j = d j,i = 1, otherwise, di, j =
d j,i = 0.
4.3 Graph Pruner
Because we aim at detecting malicious domains in a campus
or enterprise network, the HIN may contain millions of nodes
and billions of edges, it is a waste of computing resources to
model all these entities and perform the corresponding matrix
operations. Besides, The data we collect directly from DNS
traffic or logs is quite dirty with noises like irregular domains,
"large" clients, etc. Therefore, we add a graph pruning mod-
ule in HinDom to improve its performance and practicality.
The graph pruner filters nodes according to the following
conservative rules.
• Unusual domains. We remove domains that fail to meet
the naming rules, for example, icmsb2018(at)163.com,
which may be caused by mistyping, misconfiguration or
benign services’ misuse. Besides we discard domains
that are queried by only one client to focus on those that
have greater impacts over the LAN.
• Popular domains. In most cases, popular domains
queried by a large fraction of clients in a LAN are in-
clined to be benign; otherwise, there will be a signifi-
cant attack event and will be easily detected by the se-
curity management department. Besides, these popular
domains cause much computational complexity as they
are all nodes with high degrees in HIN. Therefore, we
filter out domains that queried by Kd% clients in a net-
work. To be conservative, we set Kd% to be 25% in our
experiments.
• Large clients. There are some "large" clients outstand-
ing by querying a large fraction of the whole domain
set. We find these devices are often DNS forwarders or
large proxies and thus can not represent the behavior
of regular clients. HinDom removes them to eliminate
the ambiguousness and complicacy they bring into the
system. In our evaluations, the top Ka% (empirically set
to 0.1%) most active clients are discarded.
• Inactive clients. We regard clients that query less than
Kc domains as the inactive ones. They are discarded
for the lack of effects on mining associations among
domains. In our experiments, Kc is set to be 3.
• Rare IPs. For the same reason as above, IP addresses
that only map to one domain are also filtered out to boost
performance and save computing resources.
To be more conservative for information loss caused by graph
pruning, we set some exceptions against the mentioned rules
based on label information. Considering that some attackers
try to hide by reducing activities, we keep domains with clear
malicious labels even if they are regarded as unusual ones.
Same to their related clients or IP addresses.
4.4 Meta-path Combiner
As mentioned in Section 3, meta-paths are used in HIN to
denote complex associations among nodes. Because we are in-
Table 2: Commuting Matrix of each metapath
PID metapath Commuting Matrix M Description
1 d S−→ d S domains similar to each other on character level
2 d C−→ d C the cname relationship among domains
3 d
Q−→ c Q
T
−−→ d QQT domains queried by same clients
4 d R−→ ip RT−→ d RRT domains resolved to same IP address
5 d
Q−→ c N−→ c Q
T
−−→ d QNQT domains queried by clients belong to the same subnet
6 d R−→ ip D−→ ip RT−→ d RDRT domains resolved to IPs that belong to the same attacker
terested in malicious domain detection, HinDom only chooses
symmetric meta-path where A1 = AL+1 = domains and de-
rives six types of meta-paths from the six relations mentioned
above. Table 2 displays the description and corresponding
commuting matrix Mk of each meta-path while the reasons
for choosing them are listed as follows.
• P1: d S−→ d. We have noticed that benign and malicious
domains differ in character distributions. Besides, mali-
cious domain names from the same family tend to follow
a similar textual pattern.
• P2: d C−→ d. The cname domain of a benign domain is
unlikely to be malicious, vice versa.
• P3: d Q−→ c Q
T
−−→ d. Infected clients of the same attackers
tend to query partially overlapping sets of malicious
domains while normal clients have no reasons to reach
out for them.
• P4: d R−→ ip RT−→ d. IP resources are relatively stable in
Internet, domains resolved to the same IP address in a
period tend to belong to the same class.
• P5: d Q−→ c N−→ c Q
T
−−→ d. Adjacent clients are vulnerable to
the same attacks. For example, malware propagating in a
subnet or spams aiming to clients on the same segment.
• P6: d R−→ ip D−→ ip RT−→ d. Even trying to keep flexible,
with funding limits, attackers are likely to reuse their
domain or IP resources.
Based on meta-paths, an algorithm named PathSim [32] can
be used to measure the similarity among nodes. Yet different
meta-paths represent associations from different points of
view which are not equally important in malicious domain
detection. HinDom obtains a combined meta-path with the
corresponding similarity matrix denoted as follow, where wk
is the weight assigned to each meta-path.
M′ =
6
∑
k=1
ωk ·PathSim(Mk) =
6
∑
k=1
ωk ·
2Mk(i, j)
Mk(i,i)+Mk( j, j)
Many methods can be used to compute the weight vector,
for example, linear regression with gradient descent. HinDom
chooses to use the Laplacian Score (LS) [15] for two reasons:
First, LS can be applied to unsupervised situations. Second,
as a "filter" method, LS is independent of further learning
algorithms and can evaluate features directly from the local
geometric structure of data. The basic idea of LS is to evaluate
features according to their locality preserving power. LS con-
structs a nearest neighbor graph and seeks features respecting
this graph structure. Specifically, We code all meta-paths into
a tensor T ∈ R6×n×n, where Tk,i, j = Mk(i, j), n is the number
of domains, Mk is the commuting matrix of meta-path Pk.
Then a domain meta-path representation matrix W ∈ Rn×m,
where Wk,i = ∑ j Tk,i, j is generated as the input of LS.
4.5 Transductive Classifier
Though some public domain lists are commonly used as la-
bel information in malicious domain detections, some subtle
issues are ignored. For whitelists, the widely used Alexa top
K list only contains second-level domains (2LD) sorted by
popularity, which leads to many false positives. For exam-
ple, a prevalent 2LD may hold proxies to malicious activities
and some malicious domains may rank high with a burst of
queries from the infected clients. As for blacklists, though
usually generated with robust evidences, some discrepancies
are still caused by the fickle nature of DNS. For instance,
domains like alipay.com are in DGArchive [27], a database
of DGAs and the corresponding domains. Besides, when new
malicious domains come, blacklists cannot update in time. In
a word, none of these lists is completely reliable. It is a time-
consuming and cost-expensive process to obtain an accurately
labeled dataset as the ground truth.
To reduce the cost of labeling, HinDom applies a meta-
path based transductive classification method which can per-
form well even with a small fraction of labeled samples. The
basic two assumptions in transductive classification are (i)
smoothness assumption, objects with tight relationships tend
to belong to the same class; (ii) fitting assumption, the clas-
sification results of the known nodes should consist with the
pre-labeled information. Therefore, the cost function of the
transductive classifier is as follow,
Q(F) =
1
2
(
n−1
∑
i, j=0
M′i, j‖
Fi√
Dii
− Fj√
D j j
‖2+µ
n−1
∑
i=0
‖Fi−Yi‖2)
where n is the number of domain nodes in HIN, M′ ∈ Rn×n
is the similarity matrix we get from the combined metapath,
D ∈ Rn×n is a diagonal matrix whose (i, i)-element equals
to the sum of the i-th row of M′. F ∈ Rn×2 contains each
domain’s probability of being benign or malicious while
Y ∈ Rn×2 denotes their pre-labeled information. We can see
the first term of this cost function represents the smoothness
assumption while the second term follows the fitness assump-
tion. Trade-off between the two assumptions is adjusted by
parameter µ. In order to find the F∗ that minimize Q(F), we
get
dQ
dF
= F∗−F∗S+µ(F∗−Y ) = 0
F∗ = β(I−αS)−1Y
where α=
1
1+µ
, β=
µ
1+µ
and S = D−1/2M′D−1/2.
We get the theoretical optimal solution, yet in the real world,
inverting a large matrix will consume too much computing
resources. Thus, illuminated by LLGC [37], in HinDom we
perform iterations F(t + 1) = αSF(t)+βY to approach the
optimal solution. We refer the readers to LLGC [37] for the
theoretical proof that this iteration can coverage to the op-
timal solution. The algorithm of Transductive Classifier is
summarized as follow.
Step 1, Given a HIN G = 〈V,E〉 with incomplete domain
label information Y , get similarity matrix M′ from Metapath
Combiner.
Step 2, Regularize the similarity matrix with S =
D−1/2M′D−1/2, where D is a diagonal matrix whose (i, i)
- element equals to the sum of the i-th row of M′.
Step 3, Set F(0) =Y , iterate F(t+1) = αSF(t)+βY until
it converges.
Step 4, Label domain i ‘benign’ if Fi,0 ≥ Fi,1, vice versa.
We further analyze the classification results and add do-
mains with solid labels, namely the difference between Ft [i,0]
and Ft [i,1] is higher than the threshold θ, into local whitelist
or blacklist as a supplement for further detection. Consider-
ing the dynamic nature of DNS, we only keep local label
information within 7 days.
5 Experiments
In this section, we present comprehensive experiments to eval-
uate HinDom from three aspects: performance, robustness and
practicality. For performance, we first analyze detection re-
sults and the corresponding weight of each meta-path to prove
the effectiveness of Meta-path Combiner. Then, we test Hin-
Dom in insufficient labeling scenario and multi-classification
scenario. For robustness, we test HinDom’s ability to deal
with label noises in the training dataset. For practicality, we
test HinDom when only public labels are available and deploy
it in two real-world networks: CERNET2 and TUNET.
5.1 Setup
We evaluate HinDom in two real-world networks: CERNET2
and TUNET. Our research has obtained permissions from the
relevant security management teams. The DNS-related data
we get has been processed to minimize privacy disclosure,
for example, the IP addresses of clients are desensitized by
numerical identifiers.
CERNET2, the second generation of China Education and
Research Computer Network. Jointly built by 26 universi-
ties, CERNET2 is the first IPv6 national backbone network
in China and is the world’s largest next-generation Internet
backbone network using pure IPv6 technology. At present,
CERNET2 has 25 core nodes distributed in 20 cites with
2.5G∼ 10Gbps bandwidth and provides IPv6 access services
for more than 5 million users in about 500 research institutes.
We capture DNS traffic in CERNET2 at Tsinghua node.
TUNET, the campus network of Tsinghua University. By
statistics, we find that over 0.24 million clients request about
1.5 million unique domains per day. With close supervision
and control, TUNET is much purer than CERNET2 and hides
less malicious domains.
In this research, we use DNS traffic of CERNET2 to con-
struct its HIN and just use 360 pDNS dataset for data en-
richment. As for TUNET, due to permission restrictions, we
only get the logs of its central DNS resolver. The logs and
360 pDNS dataset are used respectively to construct HIN’s
domain-client part and domain-IP part. Besides, as for DNS
traffic, we only use A, AAAA and CNAME records currently
and may expand to PDG, MX, SRV, NS, PTR for richer infor-
mation in the future.
Table 3: Description of the testing HIN instance
Nodes
Clients Benign Domains Malicious Domains IPs
~0.49M ~0.7M ~0.25M ~0.26M
Edges (C-clients,D-domains, IP-IPs,c-cname,s-similar)
C-C C-D D-c-D D-s-D D-IP IP-IP
~93M ~112M ~1.3M ~15M ~3.1M ~4.3M
Nodes Total Edges Total
~1.7M ~228.7M
To build the test dataset, we labeled about 1 million do-
mains queried in CERNET2 on 13 April 2018 by referring to
various whitelists/blacklists and expertise. For benign infor-
mation, we regard domains whose 2LD appear in Alexa Top
1K list [1] or our local whitelist as benign ones. For malicious
domains, we use multiple sources like Malwaredomains.com
[24], Malwaredomainlist.com [23], DGArchive [27], etc. We
also refer to integrated services like Google Safe Browsing [9]
and VirusTotal [34]. Besides, we manually investigate dubious
domains which have both benign and malicious information.
According to the graph pruning rules mentioned in Section
4.3, we discard some unhelpful nodes by setting Kd = 25, Ka
= 0.1, Kc = 3. Table 3 shows details about the HIN instance
we construct and Table 4 lists the evaluation metrics used in
the experiments.
Table 4: Metrics for evaluation
Metric Description
TP malicious domains labeled as malicious
FP benign domains labeled as malicious
TN benign domains labeled as benign
FN malicious domains labeled as benign
accuracy (T P+T N)/(T P+FP+T N+FN)
precision T P/(T P+FP)
recall T P/(T P+FN)
F1 2× (precision · recall)/(precision+ recall)
ROC a curve plotting TPR against FPR with various
thresholds
AUC area under the ROC curve
5.2 Metepath Combiner
HinDom relies on six meta-paths to formulate the final simi-
larity matrix. These meta-paths represent associations among
domains from different perspectives and thus have different
influences on domain detection. We test the detection perfor-
mance of each meta-path by randomly keep the label infor-
mation for 70% domains, leaving the remained 30% as test
samples and repeat the procedure for 10 times. The accuracy,
precision and recall of labels generated by each meta-path are
shown in Table 6 while the ROCs are shown in Figure 4.
Table 5: Labeled Metrics of each meta-path
PID metapath accuarcy precision recall
1 S 0.9376 0.8703 0.8712
2 C 0.9999 0.9999 0.9998
3 QQT 0.9567 0.9198 0.8860
4 RRT 0.9888 0.9879 0.9989
5 QNQT 0.9571 0.9251 0.8710
6 RDRT 0.9754 0.9580 0.9281
Noting that some meta-paths have low connectivity, which
means the classifier cannot reach plenty of domains if it only
relies on one of the meta-paths. Thus, when assigning weights
Figure 4: ROC for the labeled result of each metapath
to each meta-path, we need to consider two aspects: coverage
and accuracy. For coverage, it means with this meta-path, we
can fully exploit connections so that few domains will be left
unlabeled. For accuracy, it means among the labeled domains,
few are misclassified. The Meta-path Combiner assigns a
weight to each meta-path according to Laplacian Scores. To
test its effectiveness, we list the average detection results and
the corresponding weight of each meta-path in Table 6, where
the Unlabeled rate and F1 score reveal coverage and accuracy
respectively.
Table 6: Detection results of each meta-path
PID metapath F1 Score Unlabeled Rate Weight
1 S 0.8708 0.0027 0.1698
2 C 0.9996 0.9133 0.0003
3 QQT 0.9026 0.0917 0.1386
4 RRT 0.9934 0.5317 0.0125
5 QNQT 0.8973 0.0049 0.3826
6 RDRT 0.9428 0.2057 0.2962
combined path 0.9743 0 -
From Table 5, we can see that HinDom combines these
meta-paths in order: PID 5, PID 6, PID 1, PID 3, PID 4 and
PID 2. The combined path gets the ability to cover the whole
set of domains with high detection accuracy. It is worth noting
that some meta-paths with strong relations in domain detec-
tion (e.g. PID2: d C−→ d ) get extremely high accuracy but very
low coverage. This is consistent with the fact that domains
in a CNAME record tend to belong to the same class, yet not
many domains are in this kind of relationship. With Laplacian
Score, the Meta-path Combiner assigns these meta-paths with
relatively low weights to ensure that HinDom can detect as
many domain names as possible. Take PID 4: d R−→ ip RT−→ d
and PID 6:d R−→ ip D−→ ip RT−→ d for instance, the latter extends
its coverage by utilizing relations among IP addresses, though
introducing some noises, it can reach more domains and thus
plays a more important role in this scenario.
Table 7: Detection results with different fraction of labels
Initial Label Metrics of each method
Fraction NB SVM RF HinDom
accuarcy F1 Score accuarcy F1 Score accuarcy F1 Score accuarcy F1 Score
90% 0.9632 0.9499 0.9864 0.9827 0.9813 0.9803 0.9960 0.9905
70% 0.9429 0.9276 0.9682 0.9550 0.9700 0.9611 0.9880 0.9743
50% 0.9020 0.8912 0.9286 0.9090 0.9257 0.9180 0.9840 0.9776
30% 0.8235 0.8260 0.8527 0.8516 0.8613 0.8544 0.9698 0.9453
10% 0.7929 0.7834 0.8120 0.8031 0.8141 0.7902 0.9626 0.9116
5.3 Transductive Classification
As mentioned in Section 3.5, the public whitelists or blacklists
of domains are not completely reliable an have a number of
subtle issues. In order to reduce the cost of labeling domains
manually, HinDom utilizes a meta-path based transductive
classification method to make better use of structural infor-
mation of the unlabeled samples. To test the effectiveness
of the Transductive Classifier, in this section, we compare
HinDom with three inductive classification methods: Navie
Bayes (NB), Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Random
Forest (RF),on the situation where 90%, 70%, 50%, 30%, 10%
labels are kept randomly. For the inductive methods, we ex-
tract all details about entities and relations of the HIN instance
as features to learn the classification functions. The accuracy
and F1 score of each method are shown in Table 7. As we can
see, HinDom maintains relatively stable performance when
the fraction of initial label information decreases. It yields
accuracy: 0.9960, F1:0.9905 when 90% domains are pre-
labeled and still obtains accuracy: 0.9626, F1: 0.9116 when
only 10% labels are left at the beginning. As for the inductive
methods, they can obtain relatively good performance with
sufficient labels, yet the accuracy drops to around 0.8 as the
size of training dataset decreases. The reason behind is that
by using HIN assisted with a transductive classifier, HinDom
can not only learn from the labeled data but also fully exploit
associations among domains and generally propagates the
initial label information over the whole network.
To find the minimum threshold of label fraction for rela-
tively high performance, we gradually reduce the initial label
information and draw curves of accuracy and F1 score in
Figure 5. The breakpoint is around 10%, which means we
need to provide at least 10 percent labeled samples for domain
detection, otherwise, the performance of HinDom will suffer
a dramatic decrease.
5.4 Robutness
Though consuming lots of efforts, the manually labeled train-
ing dataset often contains noises which might be caused by
attackers’ tricks or human mistakes. In this section, to test
Figure 5: Accuracy and F1 score with different initial label
fraction
HinDom’s robustness to label noises, we keep 70% initial
label information, randomly change labels of kd% training
samples and compare the detection results of HinDom with
those traditional methods: NB, SVM and RF. We increase
kd% gradually and stop at 50% where none of these meth-
ods can generate a tolerable detection result. We repeat each
scenario for 10 times. Figure 6 shows the average accuracy
trend and F1-score trend of each method. We can see that the
traditional machine learning methods are susceptible to misla-
beling. Meanwhile, with a better understanding of structural
information, HinDom can hold relatively stable performance
when dealing with some label noises.
Figure 6: Accuracy and F1 score with kd% label noise
5.5 Multi-classification
It is observed that malicious domains from the same attacker
tend to follow the same patterns, regardless of character dis-
tributions, the victim groups or the sets of IP addresses they
map to. From the definition of Transductive Classifier, we can
see that apart from detecting malicious domains, HinDom can
support multi-classification and identify which categories the
malicious domains belong to. The domain family informa-
tion provided by multi-classification is useful for follow-up
work like reverse engineering and security reports. To test
HinDom’s multi-classification ability, we further label the
0.25 million malicious domains mentioned in Section 4.1 into
13 categories based on the malware or cybercrimines they
related to. Note that for those categories with less than F=150
domains, we group their domains together as Class Rare.
Table 8: Multi-classification with different fraction of labels
Initial Label Metrics
Fraction accuarcy precision recall F1 Score
90% 0.9814 0.9786 0.9815 0.9801
70% 0.9783 0.9759 0.9765 0.9762
50% 0.9720 0.9673 0.9706 0.9689
30% 0.9644 0.96178 0.9654 0.9636
10% 0.9598 0.9543 0.9585 0.95647
Figure 7: Confusion matrix of multi-classification with 50%
initial labels
Table 8 lists the detection results with different fractions
of initial labels. Considering the sample imbalance of each
category, we use the weighted-average metrics to evaluate
the multi-classification. With this method, the metrics of each
label will be weighted by support to find their average. Due
to space limitations, Figure 7 only displays the confusion ma-
trix of multi-classification when there are 50% initial labels.
The X axis denotes the ture category of each domain while
the Y axis denotes their predicted labels. The confuse matrix
shows that most misclassifications are between Class Benign
and some malicious classes with relatively small sample size,
which we suppose is caused by data skew. The additional in-
formation about domain family brings higher TPR yet lead to
worse FPR. To solve this problem, we will separate HinDom
into two stages, first distinguish malicious domains from the
benign ones and then multi classify these malicious domains
to identify their families.
5.6 Public Information Only
To test the real-world practicality, we eliminate the influence
of human decisions by running HinDom with initial labels
only from public whitelists or blacklists. When using lists
with only 2LDs (e.g. Alexa Top List, DGArchive), we set
domains with the same 2LD to the same class. For instance,
agoodm.m.taobao.com and chat.im.taobao.com are in benign
class because their 2LD taobao.com is in Alexa Top 1K. For
those dubious domains appear in both whitelists and blacklists,
we randomly set them to benign or malicious class. In the
end, we label about 24% of the 0.95 million domains with
about 0.04 million confused ones. HinDom yields accuracy:
0.9634, F1: 0.9253 with this kind of initial label information.
Table 9 shows the performance o HinDom with public la-
bels and with 20%, 30% manual labels while Figure 8 displays
their ROC. We can see that HinDom gets similar performance
no matter with only public information or with manual labels
of the same proportion. Besides, by analyzing the detection
results, we find that with a relatively small µ = 0.3, which
means we do not firmly insist on the pre-labeled informa-
tion, HinDom can correct the label of some domains that
are misclassified at the very beginning. For example, mem-
berprod.alipay.com and hosting.rediff.com were randomly
assigned to the malicious class because they have both be-
nign and malicious information. HinDom adjusts their labels
from 1 to 0 after 11 times iteration because of the strong
associations they have with the benign domains.
Table 9: Detection results with public and manual labels
Metrics Labels
30% Manual Public only 20% Manual
accuracy 0.9698 0.9634 0.9633
precision 0.9510 0.9367 0.9380
recall 0.9396 0.9142 0.9087
F1 score 0.9453 0.9253 0.9232
Figure 8: ROC of detection with public or manual labels
5.7 Compare with detection engines
To test HinDom’s practicality, we also compare its perfor-
mance with existing Detection Engines (DE) on VirusTo-
tal [34]. We randomly choose 30% domains from the exper-
imental dataset as testing samples and collect the detection
results of all 66 engines in VirusTotal. Due to space limita-
tions, Table 10 only displays nine engines that have relatively
good performance or that are widely used by security vendors
like McAfee, Kaspersky, etc. We can see that HinDom out-
performs six out of nine engines with accuracy: 0.9697 and
F1-score: 0.9460. This is a remarkable result as these engines
are supported by more expertise and the label information of
our experimental dataset is partly depended on VirusTotal.
Table 10: Detection results of engines from VirusTotal
Engines HinDom DE1 DE2 DE3 DE4
ACC 0.9697 0.9038 0.9785 0.8952 0.9603
F1-score 0.9460 0.8898 0.9701 0.8824 0.9511
Engines DE5 DE6 DE7 DE8 DE9
ACC 0.9812 0.9846 0.9023 0.9116 0.8974
F1-score 0.9747 0.9800 0.8975 0.9048 0.8423
5.8 Real-world Deployment
We implement a prototype system of HinDom and deploy it in
CERNET2 and TUNET. Though HinDom is not a real-time
detection system, it can be run every hour or every day to de-
tect ongoing malicious activities. Taking computing resources
and the network scale into consideration, we choose to set
the time window T to one hour in our deployment. In other
words, we construct a HIN instance based on the DNS-related
data within an hour, get the detection results, accumulate label
information, and the cycle repeats.
In CERNET2, on average, about 40 thousand clients initi-
ate 3.8 million DNS requests within an hour and about 0.25
million unique domains exist after graph pruning. With Hin-
Dom we find 3.34% domains are malicious. The result is
proved to be reliable by experts certification and some of
these malicious domains are detected several months before
they are reported by public services. In particular, HinDom
detects a bunch of domains that are not listed in any pub-
lic blacklists, neither are the IP addresses they are resolved
to. After consulting Qihoo 360, a Chinese internet security
company, we confirm these domains belong to a long-buried
mining botnet named MsraMiner. In TUNET, about 50 thou-
sand clients request for 0.4 million unique domains per hour.
With closer network supervision, the proportion of malicious
domains drops to 1.21%. However, we still detect the variation
of MsraMiner, with domains like ra1.kziu0tpofwf.club and
sim.jiovt.com, in the campus network. The above detection re-
sults have been reported to the relevant network management
department.
6 Limitation and Future Work
Currently, HinDom constructs a HIN of clients, domains and
IP addresses based on the DNS-related data and can perform
well even with a small fraction of labeled samples. Yet there
are some potential problems in views of scalability and prac-
ticability. We discuss HinDom’s limits and our future work in
this section.
First, efficiency. With a graph-based mechanism, HinDom
cannot be deployed in a real-time mode. We need to choose
a proper time window T to collect data and then conduct the
detection procedure off-line. If T is too small, the collected
data will not be sufficient for accurate detection. Yet with a
very big time window, HinDom will need more computing
resources and longer detection time. Thus, there is a trade-off
between accuracy and efficiency. We have mentioned that
the multiplication between adjacency matrices in HinDom
is a resource-consuming operation. We recommend matrix
block calculation and parallel computation framework like
Hadoop in the real-world deployment. Besides, we find that
embedding is an up-and-coming approach to represent graphs
in a low dimensional way. Some embedding methods such as
HIN2Vec [13] and ESim [30] have been proposed to repre-
sent nodes in HIN, which can be used to improve HinDom’s
efficiency.
Second, the detection range. As an association-based de-
tection system, HinDom can only detect malicious domains
that have direct or indirect relations with others. When a new
type of malicious domain is just registered and has few rela-
tions with other entities, HinDom cannot detect it immediately.
Besides, HinDom may not hold a good performance when
detecting malicious domains hosted by network services like
CDN, as they are related to a large number of benign domains.
To eliminate these problems, we plan to utilize more types
of DNS-related data and dig out richer associations among
domains. For example, WHOIS dataset is an important clue
with information about registered users or assignees. Besides,
for now, we only use A, AAAA and CNAME records in DNS
traffic and may expand to PDG, MX, SRV, NS, PTR for richer
information in the future.
Third, further analyzation. After getting domain detection
results, we can design functions and go further to find the
infected clients and malicious IPs in the network based on the
rich semantic information represented in HinDom. With this
information, the security management team can narrow down
their investigation range and focus on the most dangerous
hosts. We will add the client and IP detection module in
future work.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present an intelligent malicious domain de-
tection system named HinDom. HinDom constructs a HIN of
clients, domains and IP addresses to model the DNS scene and
generates a combined meta-path to analyze the associations
among domains. With a meta-path based transductive classifi-
cation method, HinDom performs well even when the initial
label fraction drops to 10%, which reduces the cost of acquir-
ing labeled samples. In our extensive evaluation, we verified
HinDom’s performance, robustness and practicality. In the
real-world deployment, we are able to discover a long-buried
mining botnet named MsraMiner and some other malicious
domains ahead of the public services. As for further develop-
ments, we plan to extend to other types of DNS-related data
for more comprehensive semantic information and integrate
graph embedding in HinDom to improve efficiency.
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